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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
In the school year of 1918-1919 the people of Kansas were hit
with a severe epidemic of influenza.

This caused an i nt ermittent

operation of schools over the ent ire state .

Such opera tion brought

about the question of what legally constituted a school year over
which teachers were under contract t o t each.
A few years l ater, t he experiences of t he wri t er were , as a
teacher, with t he corporate powers grant ed a rural high school and
a county high school.

At another t ime, t he writer taught in a

school in wbich two teachers met the same cl .sse s .for a period of
two weeks, each contending t hat he had a contract for the position
as teacher.
Following the writing upon t he statut es of the state, that
law wbich is popularly known as t he "Cash Bas is Law", many schools
had to issue bonds to meet the demand upon them.

Later , some of

t~wm re-financed t his bond issue.
It seems, to t he writer, that it has alw~s happened, that
when he became properly qualif i ed and certified for a good teaching

or administrative position, t hat the school law was changed and he
therefore found it necessary to furt her p repare himself .

These experiences, with others, drew the interest of the
writer to school laws.

It is said that law is a rule of action.

As long as our schools are active, laws will be needed.

As long

as our schools are democratic organizations, functioning for a
dynamic society, tb.e laws necessary for their operation will become more complex.
Modern industrial society has so multiplied the number of
social contacts and has so augmented the character of social change,
that it is absolutely necessary that new laws be spread upon the
statutes, and among them are pound to be those effecting the
operation of our schools.
However, the

laws of society have been embodied within its

activities for such a long time that they ceae

to be foremost in

the thoughts of society, and are never called to the front until
someone is damaged.

By this reason, some of tb:.ese laws have never

come before the courts for interpretation, and in this number are
many of those relating to the organization of schools.
The constitution of the state has arranged a system of courts
so that the damaged person mey appeal to them for interpretation of
the law, demanding redress.

It is the policy of our state to allow

the suitor, if defeated, to appeal his case to a higher court, if he
feels himself aggrieved.

The court may have been influenced by

passion or prejudice, or it may have erred in its construction of the

law.

In either case, it is desirable that there be a higher tribunal,

composed of judges of great learning and upright character, wb.ich
may be appealed to, to correct such miscarriage of justice.
It is from the decisions of these learned judges of the supreme
court of the State, affecting the organization of the schools, that
this thesis is prepared.

A specific law, or a popular interpretation

of a school law Will be given, affecting the organization of schools.
The question involved will be mentioned and the opinion of the court
given.
Previous studies related to the problem of the thesis are:
"Some Phases of Kansas School Law as Determined by Supreme Court
Decisionsu, by Roy Hoflund, Kansas University, 1934; "Some Phases of
School Law as Determined by Supreme Court ' s Decisions", by Rolland
R. Elliott, Kansas University, 1935; "Some Phases of Kansas School
Laws as Interpreted by the State Supreme Court", by John F. Lindquist,
Kan-s as University, 1935; "A Study of Educational Trends Affecting
School Development in Kansas from the Beginning of Statehood to the
Present Time", by Lawrence Sayler, Fort Hays Kansas State College,
1937; and "Supreme Court Decisions in Kansas Affecting the status of
Employed Teachers",

by

Leo J. Rogers , Fort Hays Kansas state College,

1938.
The problem is to review supreme court decisions in Kansas
affecting the organization of schools.

CHAPTER II

PLAlmING OF mE SCHOOL DISTRICT
It is thought to be perfectly proper that a school distri ct be
considered as only a quasi-corporation and therefore neces sarily
gover ned by legislative ~easures creating it, (Section 10-101 ,
General Statutes of 1935).
In the case of

s.

E. Bea ch, et al ., vs. Thomas Leahy , as

Treasurer, etc., an injunction i s br ought by Beach and six others,
residents, electors and tax p~ers in t he School Distr i ct No . 2,
Neosho County, to restrain Leahy, a s county trea surer , fr om collecting
certain taxes levied on proper t y of t he plai tiffs .
The records show that the board of the district had issued bonds
on t he district of t he amount of

, 15,eoo tor

a school hou se in the di strict;

that the bonds were issued in

the purpose of erecting

accordance with law (Chapter 35 of the laws of 1871); that to pay
the interest on t hese bonds t he school board had levied a tax on the
property of the tax pa&1ers of th e school district , vvb.ich was duly
certified to the county clerk and dul y entered upon t he assessment
rolls, and that the assessment r olls were in the hands of the defendant

Leahy, as county treasurer.

Plaintiff.a .claimed -and averred that said

chapter 35 was a special act and unconstitutional, and said bonds were
void.

Defendant Leahy demu.rred.

The district court of A:Pril Term 1872,

sustained the demu.rrer and gave judgment in favor of tne defendants for
costs.

The plaintiffs brought the case into the supreme court by

petition in error.
The following opinion of the court was delivered by Brewer , J.:
"School districts are corporations . They are created under
general laws. The power to vote bonds to erect school houses,
the manner in which such power shall be exercised and the amount
of the bonds that may be issued, are prescribed and clearly
defined and regulated by general laws and any act of the legislature that attempts to confer upon a school district authority
to issue bonds for a larger amount than other distri ct s similarly
situated, or seeks to release it from compliance wi th any of the
provisions of law in issuing bonds, that mu.st be complied with
by other districts to render their bonds valid is a special act
conferring corporate powers, is in direct conflict with the
constitutional provis ions above referred to and is void. 11 (1)
In his remarks upon the case, Judge Brewer stated:
"They are denominated in the books and known to the law as
quasi-corporations, rather than as corporations proper. They
possess some corporate functions, but they are primarily political
subdivisions -- agencies in administration of civil government and their corporate functions are granted to enable them to more
readily perform t heir publ ic duties .it' (2)
In t he case of Louie J. Voss, et al., vs. the Union School
District No. 11 et al., the plaintiffs alleged that they were citizens
and ta.xpeyers in t he county of Crawford and holder s of real and
personal property subject to taxation in School District No. 71, and
were chargeable with and liable to pay school taxes against them, but

1.
2.

Kansas Reports.
Ibid.

Vol. 11, p. 23.

u

they alleged that certain taxes assessed and levied as school district
taxes on their property as being in Union School District No. 11
were illegal and void.

The district court found in favor of the

defendants and gave judgment against the plaintiffs for costs.

The

plaintiffs took the case to ' the supreme court on error.
The following opinion of the court was delivered by Valentine,

"The only ground upon which the plaintiffs claim that said
taxes are inval .i d is, that said school district never had a
valid organization. · The court below, however, found that it
had a legal and valid organization; and if that finding were
really material in this case , still we think that this ~curt
could not under the evidence set it aside. That the school
district had an organization, there can be no doubt and it
devolJed ~pon the plaintiffs to show that it never had such
organization------- They cannot attack the legality of the
organization of the district in the collateral mawier in which
they have attempted to attack in this case. The organizations
of corporations or of quas,i-corporations can only be set aside
by a direct proceedings." (3)
In the case of School District No. 37 of Rice County vs. The

Board of Education of the City of Lyons, School District 69, Judge
Porter, J., dissenting:
"School districts possess no vested ri ght as against the
state. There is no vested right in the existence of a quasicorporation such as a school district. Its rights and franchises,
having been granted for the purposes of government, never
become such vested rights as against the state that they cannot
be taken awa:y. The legislature has t he authority to amend their
charters, enlarge or diminish their powers, extend or limit
their boundaries, consolidate two or more Ullder one, overrule
trreir legislative action whenever it is deemed unwise, impolitic
or unjust, and may abolish them al together." (4)

3.

4.

Kansas Reports.
Kansas Reports.

Vol. 18, P• 467.
Vol. 11, P• 23.

A school district is a quasi-corporation and therefore has no
vested corporate rights as against the state.

(Ch. 10, P. 101,

General Statutes of 1935.)
In the case of School District No. 37 of Rice County vs. The
Board of Education of the City ·of Lyons, being School District No.
69, the purpose of which was to defeat the consolidation of the

two districts, a part of the syllabus of the trial court was that,
"there is no vested right in the existence of a quasi-municipal
colj?oration such as a school district . Its ri ghts and franchises having been granted for the purpose of government can
never become such vested rights as against the state that
cannot be taken away. The legislature has authority to amend
their charters, enlarge or diminish their powers, extend or
limit their boundaries, consolidate two or more Ulld.er one,
over-rule their legislative action whenever it is deemed wise,
impolitic or unjust, and may abolish them altogether." (5)
The opinion of the court as delivere

by Porter, J.:

"There is no vested right in the existence of a municipal
organization. To put it in another way, the existence of a
municipal oorporation is not a vested right. A school district
is a mere quasi-municipal corporation and municipal corpora.tions generally are mere agencies of the government and except
as specially restrained by other constitutional restrictions,
are within the continued exclusive control of legislature." ( 6)
The notice of election petitioning for a school must be posted
and must define the territory to be included in the school district.
(Ch. 72, p. 3502,. General Statutes of 1935.)

In the case of J. N.

Schur et al., vs. Rural High School District No. 1 of Ottawa County,

5.
6.

Kansas Reports.
Kansas Reports.

Vol. 110, P• 613.
Vol. 110, P• 613.

in which resident taxpayers of the county brought action challenging
the validity of the organization, the syllabus of the trial court
in. the case embodied the statement that,

"---it is essential that the publication notice of the election
shall define the territory to be created into such a ru.ral
high school---" (7)
The following opinion of the court, delivered by Dawson,

J. ,

"This court is constrained to hold that the notice of the
election required should define the territory which is
proposed to organize." (8)
It is understood by the majority of people, that in order
to organize a school district, it is necessary that notices of
same be posted previous to the meeting concerning the organization.
In some particular instances this is not at all necessary.

It may

be that some previous action has been execu ed that lays this
procedure aside.

Or it may be that some particular law may be

involved in which the organization of a school district without
written notice may be possible.
In the case of the State of Kansas, ex rel. Charles B. Griffith,
Attorney-General, vs. Ralph A• Cannon et al .~ an action contesting
the legality of four districts was presented to the supreme court.
In this case it was shown that previously several districts had
consolidated with School District No. 100, f orming a School District

7.

a.

Kansas Reports.
Kansas Reports.

Vol. 112, P• 421.
Vol. 112, P• 421.

(~)

No. 6.

This organization turned out to be ineffective and its

officers were unable to operate, because the people refused to vote
bonds to construct school buildings, and at regularly called meetings
refused to make a levy for schoo~ purposes.

Later on, the county

superintendent was called upon to re-organize a part of the district
for school purposes.

The county superintendent did this for a

part of the district, making a public notice of the fact to all con- ·
cerned, mentioning that such would be effective, if no appeals were
taken.

Appeal was taken and the issue presented to the county

commissioners for their consideration.

The co mmissioners entertained

the appeal and affirmed t he actions of the superintendent .

The case

was then taken to the supreme court contesting the acts of the
county superintendent, the commissioners, and the thought that such
could be done without written notice of sam
The decision of the court made by Johnston,

c. J.,

presents

the fo.llowinga
"While t he written notice as required, was not given, there was
no lack of actual notice, as t he proposed action was sharply
contested by the contending parties, am when the decisions of
the county superintendent were made, those opposed promptly
took appeal to the board of county ·commissioners. In the
tribunal, the contending parties appeared and the matter of the
organization was thrashed out. When the parties app ealed from
the decision of the county superintendent, they vested the board
of county commissioners with jurisdiction of the issues involved
and thereby the defect or omission of the written notice by the
county superintendent was cured." (9)

9.

Xansas Reports.

Vol. 116, P• 325.

The idea of petitioning is, in a number of cases, looked upon
in an incorrect light and misconstrued .

It is thought that the

petitioners do the organizing aDd that the legislative measures of
the organization are through them.

This is not so.

The statute con-

cerning the creation of districts on petition and vote of electors
is no grant of legislative powers.
In the case of the State of Kansas ex rel. Herbert R. Ramsey
as County Attorney of Reno County vs. J. J. Lamont et al., the state
sought to enjoin the collection of taxes levied

for the rural high

school located at Tu.ron, Kansas, which had been organized under
chapter 284 of the Laws of 1917,
school district.

and to disorganize such rural

It was alleged that a petition to disorganize had

been presented to the school board am. that they had refused.

The

principal ground of the attack was the alleged invalidation of the
chapter 284.

The court held this act valid and in the opinion of the

court as given by West,

J.-,

t he following statements are gathered:

''It i .s contended that t b.e electors of a certain territory are
given authority to form a rural high school district and t hat
the act is void because it delegates legislative power. The
legislature has for many years, made prov isions for t he formation
of various high school districts upon petition of the electors
of a given territory . It
be said, by t hese enactments, to
furnish legisl ation by which such electors, instead of being
compelled, are given t he choice, to assume the burden of such
high school concerns. Whatever mey be the proper definition
of legislative power, the granting, rather than the exercis i ng,
of authority for certain persons to form themselves into a
sehool district, would seem to be within its meaning. The
operation of the law does not depend upon the ' will of the
petitioners, but it is the will of the legislature which is
being put in force when the board of county commissioners find

if J/ r-.,, o
r

that the prescribed condition exists within the district whicfv
the petitioners ask to have incorporated." (10)
The contention in the above case next brings forth the question;
Does the county superintendent of schools have the power and authority
to organize a new school district?

The law states that it shall be

the duty of the county superintendent of public instruction to divide
the county into convenient number of school districts, and to change
such districts when the interests of the inhabitants thereof require
it, but only after twenty days notice thereof, by written notices
posted in at least five public places in the district to be changed.
(Ch. 72, Art. 213 .)
In the case of the State of Kansas, ex rel. D. E. McCrory as
County Attorney of Pratt County vs. Fing Waters et al . as the School
Board of District No. 91, the County A.ttorney attempts to compell
the defendants to show by what authority they exercise the powers of
director, clerk. and treasurer of school district No. 91 which the
plaintiff contends was never organised.

The findings in the trial

court _were that school district No. 8 of .Pratt County was regularly
organ.ized and included the city of Preston, a city of the third class
and for a number of years maintained a graded school; that the school
district No. 22 was regularly organized and had a boundary contiguous
to that of school district No. 8 for three and one-half miles; that

10.

Kansas Reports .

Vol. 105, P• 134.

school district No. 8 and No. 22 were consolidated in 1920 and were,
therefore, known as school district No. 8; that in June, 1920, a
petition was .presented to the county superintendent, signed by
residents of the territory, praying for the organization of a new
school district to include a large portion of the territory of the
old district No. 22; that on august 21 , 1920, the county superintendent refused to create a new school district as prayed for and made
an order for the formation of another school district having
boundaries different than those described in the petition, from
which order an appeal was at once taken to the board of commissioners;
that on September 7, 1920, the appeal was sustained by the commissioners and an order was ma.de creating a school district as prayed for
in the petition; and tb.a.t afterward the defendants were elected by
the new school district, director, treasurer and clerk, respectively,
and have acted as such continuously since the election.

Judgment in

the trial court was in favor of t he defendant and the plaintiff
appealed.
The opinion of the ccurt was delivered by Marshall, J • . He statess
"The authority of the county superintendent to create new
districts does not seem to be curtailed.----- after consolidation, the authority of the county superintendent was the same
as it WO'uld have been if no colsolidation had taken place.
Other consolidations m~ be made, or new districts m~ be
created." (11)

11.

Kansas Reports.

Vol. 112, P• 60.

by the county superintendent. If approval of boundaries
followed instead of preceding signing of the petition, the
proceeding was irregular and not void." (12)
The statute provides different methods for forming a joint
school district by creating a new school district from territory
lying -in more than one county, and for forming a joint school
district by attaching land in one county to a.n existing district
in another and for altering the boundaries of a joint district
already formed.

The act making regulations covering ordinary

school districts applicable where territory is ·sought to be transferred from one rural school di st:t'ict to another, authorizes· such
transfer alt hough the application therefore is not si gned by its owners
or occupants·.

.And no question at all concerning the existing

obligations of either territory enters into the policy concerning
territory to be included.
In the case of the State of Kansas ex rel. Charles B. Griffith ,
Attorney General, vs. Rural High. School Joint District No. 8 of
Wabaunsee and Shawnee Counties, in wh.ich an effort was made to
enlarge the Rural High School Joint District No. 8 of Shawnee and
Wabaunsee Counties, an injunction was brought by the attorney
general in the name of the state to. enjoin the execution of the
order for enlargement.

12.

Kansas Reports.

In the syllabus of the court, it was shown

Vol. 113, P• 441.

that the two rural high school distr i ct s each had outstanding bonds
which 'M:>uld possibly be impared by t he de t aching of territory from
either of tb.em.
The opinion of t he cou.rt a s render ed by Mason , J ., is that:
"A final Objection to the validi ty of t he order changing
boundaries i s t hat improvement bonds of the two Wabaunsee
County Rural High School Distri cts were outstanding, the
obligations of which would be impai red by detaching ter rit ory from t hese districts. The probl em of the adjustment of
existing debts as between t he di stri ct s cr eating them and
territory detached t herefr om , is one t o be worked out
under the statutes relating to that subject. It does not
enter into the question of the policy to be followed in
regard to the territory which shoul d be embr aced within
a particular district." (13)
In the organization of a rural high s chool , it is under stood
that the voters of the di strict e st ablish the district at one
election duly held for that purpose and at a l ater elect ion designate a location for the school building

01·

site and issue bonds

top~ for t he erection of t be pl ant.
In the case of T. B. Matt hews vs . Rural Hi gh School District
No. 5 of Johnson and Miami Counties , it appears that in February
1920, a petition of the e1ectors was presented to the board of
commissioners, asking it to call a spec ial election to vote on the
proposition to establish and locate a rur al hi gh school district,
composed of certain described terri t ory.

13.

Xa.neas Reports.

Vol. 117, P• 332.

The petition specified

the location at Spring Rill.

The commissioners granted the petition

and ordered the special meeting should be held to vote upon establishing and locating a rural high school, the building therefor to
be within the city of Spring Hill.

The notice was published and

posted, but the notice omitted aJ:Jj mention of the city of Spring
Hill as the location or site of the high school.
of the meeting, the district was established.

From the holding

Later the board

purc hased land in and ad.joining the city as a site f or the building.
No steps were taken for the erection of a building until later.

At

that time an election was called for voting bonds to build the
schoolhouse and the notice of the election included the proposition
that the building was to be erected on the land owned-by the scllool
district.
were sold.

The proposition carried and shortly afterward the bonds
The contract was let for the bu.ild ng before a:n.y

questions were raised.
The question now raised by a ta.xp~er was that there was no
effective vote fixing the location or site of the building at Spring
Hill.
The opinion of the court, delivered by Johnson,

c.

J., was:

"The location or site might and do,u btless would have been
fixed by the· vote cast at the first election if the matter
of the location had been included in the notice of election.
The remlt of the omission was that nothing more than the
establishment of the district was determined at that election.
Under the statute all the propositions, including establishment, locating and voting of bonds to provide means for a
school building, might have been submitted at a singl e
election if proper notice of the proposition had been given.

However, it was competent for the vot ers to first determine
a single question, whether a di strict should be established
and leave to the latter election the propositi on of location
or site of the building and the issuance of bonds top~
for it. 11 (14)
Closely related to this is another case testing the law that the
ru.ral school district ca.w:i.ot change school site without the vote

of the electors of t he district.
In this case, Olin G. Cline et al ., vs.

w.

G. Wettstein et al.,

a mandamus to compell the School .District No . 24, Stevens CoUllty,
to construct and erect two school houses in the district and to
maintain the two, schools for the year, it is shown. that the district
in March voted bonds for a new school building; after a special
meeting in M~ in which a proposition to build two new buildings
on separate sites had been co nsidered and vote

down , the board

attempted to carry out the expression of t he voters.

The old

bu.ildiXJg had been torn down and preparation for the new building
had commenced upon the old site.

The proposition at the previous

meetings b.avillg failed, the board was building the one building
upon its own property, the old school site , when the writ was
served upon it to cease and show wey it should not build the two
buildings.
In the opinion of the court, delivered by Porter,

14.

Kansas Reports.

Vol. 120, P• 347.

J., he

quotes Chief Justice Johnson;
"Can it have been intended that after a tax has been voted,
contracts made and teachers employed, ten ta.xpeyers who
failed to attend or who were outvoted at the annual meeting,
can on request, require another meeting to be called and
another test of strength taken on one or more of the propositions? If at the annual meeting, directions were given
to put a new roof or to make other repairs on a school house ,
after the contract has been let,
a resident builder
who failed to get the job, procure nine others to join him
in a petition and have the qu.est~on reopened and the
contracts, partially executed, annu.led? If questions which
provoke controversy, like the selection of a site, could
be reopened whenever ten disappointed taxpayers might ask
for another vote, dissention and disorder would prevail in
ma.cy school districts much of the time."
(15)
It is a general

opinion that in case the district cannot

decide upon the boundaries, the question may be appealed to the
county superintendent and the county body of commissioners.

As

a final arbitrator in the matter, t he state superi ntendent may
act in case the afore mentioned officials cannot come to a
conclusion.

But that tile state superintendent has no authority

to approve boundaries of districts in more than one county until
the superintendent and commissioners fail to agree.
In the case of the State of Kansas ex rel., vs. Jess

w.

Miley, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al., it
appears that the County Superintendent, Geo. A• .Allen, and the
commissioners of Coffey County, without

any

authority for so doing,

attempted to approve boundaries of the proposed Leroy Rural High

15.

Kansas Reports.

Vol. 99, p. 404.

School District No . 4, Coffey County, Kansas;

that none of the

electors had peti t .ioned for the approval of these boundaries;
that the appeal was made to the State Superintendent, Jess.
Miley,

for final arbitration.

to enjoin Jess

w.

w.

The plaintiff in the case seeks

Miley from hearing t he appeal concerning the

organization of the proposed rural high school di strict and to
enjoin all the other defendants from any manner participating in
the further organization or attempt to organize t he rural high
school district.
The opinion of the court as given by Marshall , J., is that:
"----the state superintendent of public instruction has no
authority to act until there has been a disagreement between
the county superintendent and ·boards of county commissioners
of two or more counties concerning the boundaries of proposed
rural high schools. Under the allegat ions of the petiti on,
the state superintendent of public iv truction was undertaking to a ct without aut hority and the state could maintain
an action to restrain him." (16)
As a final thought in the planning of the school district let
us consider that the power of the legislature is to change any
boundaries of school districts and apportion property.
In the first part of t he chapter it was considered that school
district organizations were quasi-corporations, acting by authority
of the state.

This means that such are entities of the state,

thereby placi.cg the state in an authorative position.

16.

Kansas Reports.

Vol~ 120, P• 321.

In the case of the Board of Education of the City of Topeka,
vs. the State of Kansas and School District No. 22, as appealed to
the supreme court, the Kansas Permanent School Fu.nd seeks to recover
a series of bonds from School District No. 22 of Shawnee County .
Findings in the case show that in august , 1889, the city of Topeka,
by an ordinance extended its boundaries to include a large portion
of the adjoining territory of school district No. 2·2 and annexed
to the city that part of the district on which the school house
stood.

The bonds which the plaintiff seeks to recover are those

of school district No. 22, issued prior to -the annexation act
of the city of Topeka, and
a.Dd

building.

f or the purchase of the school site

.Agreements were made between the two contracting

bodies, upon annexation, as to the liabilities upon the payment of
the bonds.
In 1893, an act was passed by the legislature entitled&
"An Act relating to, cities of the fi rst and the second class

providing f'or the settlement between a school district or a part
of a district and a city, when annexed by the extension of the
city limits, providing th.at when all the territory of a school
district is annexed to a city all its property ab.all be transferred to the board of education of such a city and the latter be
held responsible thereafter for the valid floating and bonded debt
of the district".

The opinion of the court as delivered by Smith, J .:
lt is within the constitutional power of tb.e legislature
when a part of the territory of a school district upon
which a schoolhouse is situated is taken into a city to
charge the latter with the p~ment of bonds issued by the
district to build the schoolhouse, although the city should
annex no more than the site of the building•" (17)

11

17 .

Kansas Reports.

Vol. 64, P• 6.

CONCLUSIONS
School districts are governed by the legislative acts
creating them.

They are quasi-corporations, rather than cor-

porations proper, and act, primarily, as political subdivisions,
or as agencies of civil government.

They are created by statute

to enable them to more readily perform their public duties.
School districts are held valid, but have no vested corporate
rights as against the state.
The notice of election for organization mu.st define the
territory to be included in the district.
In the formation of a new district, terri tory

may

be taken

from a consolidated terri to,ry .
In the notice of election for a new district t he description
of bOUJldaries is held to be sufficiently certain.
The organization without a written notice is upheld where
parties have had actual notice.
The statute concerning the creation of a district on petition
and vote of electors is no grant of legislative power.
The county superintendent has authority, under statute, to
organize a new school district.

An

omission to recite the boundaries of a new district which

was approved by the coW1ty superintendent does not invalidate the
organization.
The que stion of existing obligations does not enter into t he
policy concer ning territory to be included in the district .
The district may be established at one election, and t he
establishment of the site and the declaration of t he bond issue
at another.
The ru.r al school district cannot change the school site
without the vot e of the electors of the district .
The state superintendent of public instruc ti on has no authority
to approve boundaries of school distri cts in mor e than one county ,
until the county sup erintendent and cou.nty commissioner s fail ~o
agree.

The stat e legislature has the power to change the bou.ndar ies
of school districts aod to apportion property.

OH.APTER III
PREPARING OF THE SCHOOL BUDGET

The state law reads, Ch. 79, Art . 2925, "This act shall apply
to all taxing subdivisions or municipalities of the state, including
counties, cities of the first , second and third class, townships,
(except townships in counties having the county road unit system
and having an annual e.xpendi-ture of less than <iP200, which township
shall be exempt from the prov isions of this act) , school districts
of all types, community high school districts, drainage districts
and li orary boards"; Oh. 79, Al't . 2926 , "------The state tax commission shall prepare and furnish forms for the an.nu.al budgets of
common-school districts, rural high school d i stricts , community
high school districts, all high school_ districts located outside of
cities of the first and second class,

and

townships as herein

prescribed in this act.------- The said tax commission shall
deliver the form for all school districts within each county to the
superintendent of schools within each county who shall immediately
deliver copies to the clerk of the respective school districts and
boards of education within each county.---- It shall be the duty,
and it is required th.at the governing oody of such taxing subdivision
or municipality within the state to prepare, make and publish the
financial statement and budget required oy this act;°

Ch. 79,

There are but few times in wh ich the contesting of this law
has been carried to the supreme court for its interpretation .

There

is only one case which is of interest to us in thi s di scu.ssion.

In

this particular case, D. 1 . Voshell vs. Anton Peterson, as Clerk of
McPherson County, the plaintiff, a taxpav7er of School District
No. 30 of McPherson County, brought the action to enjoin the alleged
illegal tax levy which tb.e defendant clerk was about to spread upon
the tax rolls of the school district.
After the bu.dget had. been ad.opted by the district at its
annual meeting in due courae of legal procedure and the same
delivered to the county clerk as prescribed by law, he made an
independent calculation and reduced the bu.dget.

The ri ghts of

both parties is not que stioned in the case, the facts developed
with the decision of the trial court, that the l evy by the clerk
was not sufficient.
The opinion of the court , gi ven by Dawson, J. is:
.. ----another reason wby some of the justices of this court
cannot approve t he judgment of the trial court may be added
here; the constitution contains a mandate to the legislature
to establish, encourage and maintain a system of public
schools. That mandate has been loyally executed from the
foundation of the state. The oash-basis law of 1933 is
intended to put the financial affairs of the common schools
upon .the solid foundation -- upon a pay-as-you-go-basis.
The judgment of the trial court completely defeats that
legislative purpose. If the injunction complained of were
permitted to stand, school district No . 30 could not possibly
maintain a school and pay the expenses thereof in conformity
with the cash-basis law during the autumn of 1936 . .. (2)
2.
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The Cash Ba.sis Law affecting the school budget, reads, Ch.
10, Art. 1101, "The following words, terms and phrases, when applied
in this act, shall for the purpose of this act, have the meanings
respectively ascribed to them in this section, except in those
instances a different meaning, "municipality", shall be constru.ed
and held to mean county, township, city, board of education,
municipal university, school district, high school district, drainage district and any other similar political subdivision or taxing
district of the state.

The words "governing

body 0

,

shall be con-

strued and held to mean board of county commissioners of any county,
township board of any township, mayor and councilmen or board of
commissioners of any city, board of education of any city, school
board of 81J3 school district, board of trustees of any high school
board, board of regents of a.ey municipal univers ity, board of
directors of a.ny drainage district, board of park commissioners of

aey city and any other body or board of a municipality, having
authority under the laws of this state to create indebtedness against
the municipality. ---";

3

Ch. 10, .Art. 1102, ''.£11 municipalities are

required to pey or refinance their valid indebtedne ss as in this
act provided, in the manner and at the times herein set forth , and
to contract no indebtedness after M~ 1, 1933, except as herein
provided.

It is hereby declared that the pu~pose of this act is to

provide for the funding and payment of all legal debts and obligations

3.

General Statutes of Kansas.

1935, P• 98.

except present bonded indebtedness of all municipalities and f or
the future conduct of the financial affairs of such municipality
4

upon a cash basis . "

Like the school bud.get law, the cash basis law has but a very
few trial cases in the matter referred to the supreme court for
interpretation.

These cases are purely trial cases, contesting

the constitutionality of the measure.
in our discussion,

mEcy

be cited;

Only one case with interest

that of the State of Kansas, ex rel.,

Roland Boynton, Attorney General, vs. the Board of Education of the
City of Topeka,
The syllabus of the trial court read; "constitutional law-validity of Cash Basis Statute-Contract Obligations--Division of
Tax Revenue.

In a proceeding questioning t he validity of a recent

legislative measure (house bill No. 745) , the statute is examined
and held not to be invalid for any of the reasons suggestede
proceedings in mandamus.
issue, on pra.ecipt."

5

Opinion filed April 29, 1933 .

Original

Write to

Following t he appeal to the supreme court, the op inion of the
court was delivered by Harvey, J.

He reviewed the case in all its

possibl e phases and held with the trial court.

4.
5.

General Statutes of Kansas. 1935, P• 99.
Kansas Reports . Vol . 137, P• 451.

CONCLUSIONS
After the budget has been ad.opted by the

electors of the

school district, it is the duty of the clerk of the school board
to present it to the county commissioners for the consideration of
that bod,y, which will hand it to the county clerk for him to spread
upon the tax rolls.
The legislative acts concerning the finances of the school,
popularly known as the "Cash Basis Law", have been held valid by
the interpretation of the supreme court .

CHAPTER IV
BUILDING PROGRAM

It is generally understood that the members of the school
board, as such, are representatives of that covporate body, and
will act within the good faith of that body~

In some particular

instances it cannot act without the direct authority of the body,
called into a meeting and operating as an entity.

In such a case

is that of the school board being unable to build a schoolhouse
Wlless it has first been legally authorized to do so.

Such is

shown in the case of William Brown and Willis Jackson vs. the
School ~istrict No. 80, of Graham County, Kansas.
Brown and Jackson, in this case, brought SI.lit against the school
board to collect for the building of a schoolhouse, preswnedly for
School District No. 80 of Graham County.

The petition alleged the

making of the contract with tb:e school board, and the construction
in accordance therewith of a schoolhouse.

The liability of the

school district is the only question presented by the record.

The

findings in this case were unable to show in the record any evidence
of authority vested in the district board to make the contract in
question.
The opinion of the court, offered

by

Garver, J. was:

"Having only limited authority in a matter of this kind, the
officers of a school district ca.n only carry out the expressed
will of the electors of the district. If they act without such
direction, or exceed the power conferred upon them, their action
does not bind the district . They have no inherent power as a
board to build a schoolhouse, or to create aziy district liability
in a matter that is committed by the statute exclusively to the
qualified voters of the district . This statute also confers upon
the electors of a school district the exclusive ri ght and power
to select a site for the district schoolhouse. After the voters
of a district at a meeting duly called, have selected a site
for the schoolhouse, have determined what kind of a house they
will build, and have provided funds for that purpose , the district
board as mere agents may carry out the will of the inb.abi tant's
of the district so expressed.----- Anyone d ealing with the
board is bound to take notice of the limitations of its authority.
Hence, in order to base a recovery upon a contract entered into
with a school board, su.ch as alleged in thi s case, it must be
shown that the contract was authorized by the voters of the
district.----- We are unable to find in the record any
evidence of authority in the district board to make the contract
in question ." (1)
In the program of building as set upon by the state laws and
as is practiced by the school districts, it is co nsidered that
ea.ch district must own c:l.lld operate its own building.
ticular cases it has been found proper

and

In some par-

legal that two or more

districts m~ consolidate, in which occasion the building site
of one or the otner may be considered as thdt of and belonging
to the consolidated district.
In the organizing of some rural high schools, the district
embodying that of an ardinary school district, it seemed logical
and advisable to use the one builaing for the two schools.
practice the law does not permit.

1.

But this

Rural high school and ordinary

Kansas Report, Court of .Appeals.

Vol. 2, P• 309.

school districts cannot unite in construction of a school bu.ilding
for their joint use.
In tne case of A. T. Stewert vs.

c~

H. Gish et al., A. T.

Stewert, a taxpayer, having interest within the school district,
brought action against the officers of the rural high school
district to enjoin the issuance of bonds for the erection of a
high school building, and ·against tbe officers of a school district
to enjoin them in the erection of a school building to be used by
both organizations .

He was denied relief in the trial court a.nd

p.ppealed .
The opinion of the court as given by Mason, J. is that:
"Whilst it is possible that there might be some saving in
this arrangement at the start, it is evident t hat in the
long run, complications might arise which would compel the
abandonment of the use of the property by the common school
district . It is better that both the spirit and language of
the statute should be observed and that the common school
buildings should be devoted exclusively to the purpose for
which it is intended.
Inasmuch as the rural high school district and the ordinary
school district are separate organizations, we think that
without express legislative authority, they have no power
to join in the erection of a schoolhouse for their common
benefit . The situation that would be created, involving a
divided control , no division being made for determining
what course should be persued if a difference of opinion
should arise in some matter or pol icy relating to the use
or the care , preservation or :improvement of the building,
is so a.,n.runalous that we cannot regard the authority to enter
into such an arrangement as fairly inferable from that
granted to eac n to erect a schoolhouse for its own use.
It is true that in a particular case no difficulty in administration might arise . But the possibility of the plan here
sought to be followed out is so open to debate, that we feel

constrained to hold tbat until further legislation on this
subject, a single building mey not be erected by the two
districts for their common use." (2)
In very close relationship to building, comes that of remodeling and improving .

In aey number of instances the two mey be

considered as one as rar as tne legal set up is concerned.

But

that of repair upon the buildings is farther related and will need
be considere4 separately .

The right to remodel and improve is not

implied from authority to repair as shown in the case of

c.

F.

Conklin and another, vs. School District 37, etc. -.A school district
is bound by t he contract of its board for repairs of its schoolhouse and that notwithstanding that, at the annual meeting , a
given sum was voted for certain specified repairs,

and

such sum

had already been expended in such repai rs.
In this case, the plaintiffs repaired a door of t he building,
and painted over some obscene writing upon the walls.
billed the school board for five dollars.

They

The contention of the

school board is that the district board is limited to the amount
of the money voted for repairs at the school meeting , and to the
kind of repairs specified in such vote,

and

the testimoey shows

that the board had already exhausted the moneys voted for the repairs specified ,

and

claims that the powers of the board were

exhausted and toe contract not binding upon the board.

2.
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Justice Brewer, J., gives this decision of the court in the
case:
"The district is a _c orporation with the usual powers of a
corporation for public purposes and the board is its managing
authority. True, its powers are few and limited, but still
reasonable construction mu.st be given to the powers which are
granted . And where a duty is imposed, especially one so
vital as this to the well being of the district , it will be
understood that it is to be performed in the ordinary manner
and by the ordinary means. It Will be noticed by the law,
that when the board builds, hires or purchases a schoolhouse,
it is expressly stated th.at it shall be done nout ot the f'u..Dds
provided for that purpose"; but no such limitation is expressed
when the duty is cost of the care and keeping of the schoolhouse . The reason is obvious. In mere matters of repairs
and pr eservation, there is little room for expenditure; in
building, hiring or purchasing, there may be great extravagences. Again it is the very nature of repairs that they cannot
be foreseen, and necessary amount determined in advance.
Who can tell when and to what extent just such injuries as
appear in this case will occur? Discretion as to these
matters must be vested somewhere and nowhere more appropriately
than in the district board. and so we Ullderstand the
legislature has provided.n (3)
It is in accordance with the law, and understood by those in
charge of public funds, that when a building program is necessary,
it is advisable that the contractor of such a building be placed
under bond to guarantee complete and satisfactory execution of
that contract.

It is not at all unusual to write within the con-

tract of construction that such a bond is required for the faithful performance of the work , with so.ch securities as the board mey
approve.

Such a clause, so inserted, becomes a part of the contract.

The execution of such a contract cannot be until the details of
every clause is met .
3.
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Such a case is that of H. J. Vandenberg et al., vs. the
Board of Education of Wichita.
In this case, the city of Wichita, desirous of erecting a
school building costing approximately $170,000, received bids and
accepted the offer of the H. J. Vandenberg
of the building.

&

Son for the erection

In the contract offered the H. J. Vandenberg

&: Son, signed by both contracting parties, was the clause, "The

owner shall have the right to re quire the contractor to give
bond covering the faithful performance of the contract, and the
p~ment of all obligations arising thereunder, in such form as the
owner may prescribe

and

with such sureties as he may approve."

The lnilding company executed bonds and presented them to t he
board for its acceptance.

The bonds were exami ned by a committee

of the board acting with its attorney whicu caused a rejection
of same and a declaration by the board that the contractor had
failed to comply with the conditions of t l1e award and that such
contract was rescinded.

At this,· the contracting company sued the

school board, demanding an execution of its contract.
The decision of the court, given by Marshall, thata
"The defendant had the right to approve the bond and the
right to exercise discretion in that approval. The defendant
was not compelled to accept whatever bond the plaintiffs should
offer, even if it were good, but could insist on a satisfactory bond being given, capricious or in bad faith. The
objection made by the board to the bonds tendered cannot
be said to have been unreasonable, capricious or in bad
faith, because in the event of an action on the bonds to

recover therefrom, if the surety companies had pleaded that
the bonds had been executed without authority, the defendant
might have been unable to prove that they had been executed
with aut~ority . Because the bond offered was not approved,
the contract did not become binding on the defendant and for
that reason the plaintiffs cannot recover any damages that
may have been sustained by them. 11 ( 4)
As mentioned in t he previous discussion, the reading of the
bonding clause is more or less universal.

However, it does happen

that this clause may be written a number of different ways .

The

reading of a number of them is "Give bond according to the state
law of the State of Kansas ."

The condition upon whi ch liability

depends as written in the state law is stated in t hese words,

11

if

the said principal shall faithfully perform such contract according
to the terms, covenants and conditions thereof".

A contract

reading for a bond that contractor will "faithfully perform" contract,
implies more than merely p ~ ing for the material and labor.
This is decided in the case of H.

c.

Hensley and

o.

G.

Brosius as Partners, etc., vs. School District No. 87 of Anderson
County, and the Equitable Surety Company.

In this case the

school dis t rict entered into contract with a J. T. Allen for the
building of a schoolhouse.

Allen gave bond, executed by the

Eauitable Surety Company, conditioned for his "faithful performance
thereof".

He failed to complete the building , and a number of

mechanic's liens were filed against it.

4.
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The sc hool district sued

the Surety Company and obtained a judgment covering all the
mechanic's liens against the building a.nd ;ip500 for damages,
because of the contractor's failure to complete the wilding .

The '

Surety Company appealed the case, contesting the ~500 item on the
ground that it was no~ covered by the bond.
, The opinion of the court, delivered by Mason, J. is in this
wording:

•

"We think the language of the bond too ex~licit to admit of
a meaning so far from that naturally to be placed upon it .
The Surety Company undertook that Allen should faithfully
perform his contract according to its terms. This is the
usual scope of a bond of this character • .&. failure to pey
material men and laborers is only one of a variety of ways
in which building contractors may violate their agreements.
The bond here gi ven mu.st be held broad enough in its terms
to cover the loss resulting from Allen 's abandonment of t he
building before its completion." (5)
The means whereby t he building program is financed wi ll be
discussed in the next chapter.

It is the customary practice to

bond the district then sell the bonds .

The next chapt er treats

entirely upon bonding and indebtedness.

Occasions may arise in

which gift s are made for this purpose in connection with the sale
of bonds.

We have one of these cases cited, in which the expendi-

tures of voluntary contributions are mentioned as not being
prohibited by the statute, providing that such is mentioned in bonding
and

5.

that the cost be within the estimate.

Kansas Reports .

Vol. 97, P• 56.

In this case, J . M. Wright et al., vs. the Board of Education
of the city of Leavenworth, the Boa.rd of Education of Leavenworth
depided to erect a building for industrial-training, and submitted
to t he voters a proposition to issue f 50,000 in bonds for t hat purpose, finding that sum sufficient, together with $10,000 to be
contributed by a voluntary organization.

Believing the two sums in

hand insufficient, it levied a two mill tax. in order to bring t he
available sources up to the requi red amount •

..1n action was

brought by the taxp~ers to enjoin its further proceedings in
pursuance of the plan.

In the syllabus of t he trial court, six

different divisions of objections were presented for the consideration of the supreme court.

Of this group, we wil l consider but

the one entering our discussion, that of the statutory restrictions
preventing the board from accepting a nd expending upon t he buil ding,
proceeds contributed to the ~sso_ciation or school d istrict or
organization .
The opinion of the court as given by Mason, J. is that:
"It was not an infringment of t he statute for t he boa.rd to
provide for the construction of a building at a cost of
~10 ,000 in excess of the proceeds of ttie bonds and the tax
upon that amount , being placed at its disposal for such a
purpose by individuals who were willing to make this contribution to the building fund. Such restrictions to protect
the taxpayers by limiting their liability in the matter,
and not to prevent the acceptance and utilization of voluntary
contributions in aid of public enterprises. This has been
determined in seve~al cases arising under similar statutes." (6)

6.
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CONCLUSIONS
The district school board cannot build a school house unless
it has been legally authorized to

do

so.

_ Rural hjgh schools and ordinary school districts cannot unite
in construction of a school building for their joint use.
The right to remodel and improve a school building may not
be implied from the authority to repair.
The contract for the erection of a school building is not
binding upon either party until the bond has been properly
approved and executed.

Neither can a construction company re-

cover where the failure of the school board t o approve a bond was
not in bad faith.
A bond in which it is stated that the contractor will
"faithfully perform" contra.ct implies more than merely p~ing for
the material and labor.
A school board may expend

voluntary contributions for

building, providing the cost of the building be within the estimate.

OH.A.PTER V
BONDING .AND INDEBTEDNESS

Ma,y we now turn our attention to the financing of a. school
program by bonding.

As a school district is a quasi-corporation and

not a. paying oo~o.rration, it is necessary that it depend almost
entirely upon the receipts from taxation to finance its operation.
,However, occassions arise in which the receipts are not ad.equate
and the district finds it necessary to issue and sell bonds for
that purpose .

And, it is usually the practice, that upon building,

the school district issue a.nd sell bonds for tbat purpose.
"The call for an election to be held after the creation of a
school district to vote upon the question of issuing bonds for

(1)

building is required to be made by the board of such a district."
It is within the authority of such a board to issue the notices
calling the meeting of the district electors for such purposes,
for without the direction of these electors, it find s itself
unauthorized to operate in the matter.

We have an irregularity in this proceedure; that of the operation of the administrative body of the county high school.

In

this particular case, it is provided, that upon presentation of a

l.

Kansas Re-ports .

Vol. 109, P• 206.

(previously cited)

petition of twenty-five percent of the legal voters of a county
asking for an election of a proposed bond issue to build a county
high school, it shall become the duty of the board of county commissioners to call such election.
In the case of The Board of County Commissioners of the County
of ~reeley vs .

w.

E. Davis,

as State Auditor, etc., the Board of

County Commissioners of Greeley County applied to the court for a
writ of mandamus to require the state auditor to register a bond
issue of $10 , 000

to pa_y for a county high school building

recently erected in Greeley County, pursuant to a s_r:acial election
called by the commissioners on May 15, 1916 , and which was held
on August l, 1916.

The auditor declines to register the bonds on

the grounds that no petition was ever presented to the board of
county commissioners calling for w.ch a meet ing of the electors
as was called by the board upon the date of May 15, 1916, and that
such issuance of bonds is void.
denied

a.ni

In the trial court, the writ was

the plaintiff appealed to the decision of the supreme cou-t.

The opinion of the supreme court was given by Dawson, J. as
follows:
It will be observed that the acts of 1897, 1903 and 1907
form a complete and independent program for the establishment
of county high schools and for housing high school pupils
in counties of less than six thousand population. These
acts need no aid from the general statutes, authorizing
county commissioners to determine, at their discretion, the
necessity for permanent county building s aDd to call a bond
election to provide funds therefor • .iW.d. since the high school
acts provide their own procedure for setting in motion the

11

process by which a county high school building mey be procured,
such processes are exclusive. One of these was the presentation to the board of county commissioners a petition signed
by twenty-five percent of the legal voters of the county. Now
such petition was suomitted, consequently the statutory basis
on wnich the county board called the election was wanting.
The election was, therefore, called without lawful authority
and its result is void. " (2)
J..n.other irregularity is that of the operation in first and
second class cities .

i~en the city board of education has determined

the necessity for a school bond election , and has certified its
action to the city mayor, that officer has no option other than
to call an election for that

purpose .

In the case of the State of Kansas ex rel., R.
as County Attorney etc., et al., vs.

o.

c.

McCormick,

H. Bentley, as Meyor etc.,

the Wichita Boa.rd of Education made application t o the court f'or
a writ of manda.rrru.s to compel the ma,yor of the city of Wichita to
call an election on tb.e proposition to issue bonds for an additional
high school building required to relieve the congested situation
of the city schools.

The mayor declined to call the eleation

with the answer that the city had insufficient f'\uids with which to
m~et the expenses of the election; that it had made no arrangement
in its fiscal budget for the election, but if the board of education
would turn over to the city a sufficient sum to stand the expenses,

2.
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Vol. 99 , p. l .

he would call the ele ction.

This the board of education refused

to do and asked for satisfaction

through the courts.

The opinion of the court in this matter was delivered by
Dawson, J . :
"The Board of Education and the Ui ty are separate corporate
entities. That their territorial limits largely coincide
is immaterial . The wisdom and discretion of the board of
education are not reviewable by the mayor. He is merely the
ministerial officer designated by the statute to call the
election. The sheriff or county clerk , if thus designated ,
would answer the purpose just as well . The school board
determines the necessity of the election. There is nothing
equ.ivocal touching the meyor's duty . He must call the
election within thirty days after receipt of the board ' s
certificate . The plaintiffs are entitled -to the judgment."
(3)

In the original mandamus proceedings of the Rural High School
District No .
vs.

w.

1 , of Rush County, by A• L. Farmer as Director etc.,

E. Davis as Auditor etc . , the school district trys to compel

the state auditor to register bonds issued by the district.

The

writ was allowed in the trial court and appealed to the supreme
court for its interpretation.
The aud itor resisted the writ upon the grounds tbat the act
violated se cti on 16 of article 2 of the state constitution; that
the plaintiff is not a body corporate and has no authority to
maintain this acti on; and tbat the provisions of the act are so
indefinite as to confer no authority to issue :b.onds .

3.
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Vol.

98, P • 442 .

The interpretat ion of the cou.rt as given by Marshall , J .
is that:
"This court has often said, concerning this provision, that
no narrow or technical rule should be adopted to defeat the
operation of the law, and that it is not necessary that the
title be a.n abstract of tb.e entire act. --- Before . an act
of the legislature can be declared invalid, it must clearly
appear that the act violates some constitutional pDovision.
---- Observing these rules , we ca.n not say that the establishment of rural high school districts does not include every
thing that is necessary to organize such school district,
build schoolhouses and maintain and operate schools. The
title of the act is not misleading. 1 t is broad enough to
include authority to vote bonds for the erection of a
school building . This act is not unconstitutional. The
rural high school district is placed under the same authority
and has the same obligations as sc hool districts , with the
few exceptions as named in the act . Therefore, rural high
school districts are bodies corporate and have authority to
sue and be sued . It follows tb.at the plaintiff can maintain
this acti on." (4)
The legislative act of 1923 converted tb.e county high schools
into community hign schools .

In the old coU.llty high school set- up

the county commissioners , with three members c hosen by the electors
of the district, constituted the school board, over which the county
superintendent of public instruction sat as chairman-exofficio.

By

the new law, the personnel of the boa.rd was changed; the county
commissioner members being relieved of their duties as members.
This relief of the county commissioner membership was thought to
change the organization from that of the county to one of a regular
school district.

4.
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In the case of The State of Kansas ex rel . ,

c.

B. Griffith as

Attorney-General, vs. Mrs . Myrtle Newbold et al . as the Board of
Trustees of the Norton Cou.uty Community High School District, we
have a case brought by the state on the relation of the attorneygeneral to require tb.e board of trustees of the community high school
in Norton COUD.ty to call an election upon the proposition of issuing
bonds for the erection of a bUilding, the purpose of which being
to settle the qu.estion whether t he statutes gives the defendants
power to do so .
In the original proceeding, the writ was denied, upon wh ich
the case was immediately presented to the supreme court for its
interpretation.
The following opinion of the court was delivered by Mason, J.:
"The county high school which in 1923 converted into the
community high school district here involved, was organized
under a special act, providing for such organization in
accordance with a general statute. J.~either the special nor
the general act author'ized the issuance of bonds to erect a
buil ding for this county high school and the latter forbade
the board of trustees to contract for school buildings in
excess of the amount on hand ani to be raised by one year's
tax . Clearly the Norton County high school was not included
in the grant to school districts of power to issue bonds for
schoolhouses, and its mere conversion into a community highschool district with restricted boundaries does not in our
judgment by any p ermissible liberality of construction
enlarge it authority in this resp ect. The writ asked is
denied. " (5)
·

5.

Kansas Reports .

Vol . 114, P• 485 .

After a :rural high school has been organized, by legal
proceedings, but not extending to the purchase of a site and building, the meeting for the selection of the site and the voting of
bonds mey be called by the school board upon petition presented
to such a board.
_ In the case of

s. s.

Reynolds, vs. Frank B. Clark et al., as

the Board of ~rainfield Rural High-School District No. 4, an
action was brought to enjoin the issuance of bonds voted by the
rural high school district to enable it to construct a high-school
building.

A temporary injunction was dissolved a.ud the plaintiff

appealed.
It was within the finding of the court, that the rural high
school district had been orga.uized, but the p roceedings did not
extend to the voting of bonds for the purchase of a school site,
or the selection of a site for the building.

It was further s hown

tha.:b. the school operated for a period of one year, leasing the
building for its use.

In February of 1917, a petition for an

election to vote bonds for the erection of a building was presented
to the school board.

The board called the election; the election

was held ani the results favorable to the issuance of bonds for the
construction of the school building.
The opinion of the court as delivered by Burch, J. is t hat:

Greenwood County Rural High-School from issuing bonds in the sum of
50,000 which the district had voted for the purpose of constructing
a school building , on the allegation of numerous irregularities in
the notice of the election.

None of these irregularities given in

the syllabus are of interest to us in this discuss ion, excepting
number four, which reads that "The district officers' names were
not signed to the election notices."
The findings of the court in this instance were that the officers
names were all upon the notice, which had been furnished by the state
department for such purposes; that such officers names had all been
written by one hand, that of, presumedly , the clerk,

anu

such signa-

tures were in iDk and had been written by the direction of the
other members.
The ruling of the court as given by Dawson, J. is that:
"The third defect urged was that tbe officers of the district
did not sign the notices -- that one of them signed the names
of the others. But the others sanctioned the signatures, which
were written in their presence . It is familiar law that where
a.person's name is signed for him at his direction and in his
presence by another, the signature becomes his own, and has
precisely the same validtity as if he had written it himself."
(7)

In this same case, another thought is brought out quite
vividly by the decision of the judge, and perhaps attention should
be called to it .

In discussing the operation of the notice he seys:

ttThe statute says, that printed or typewritten notices of bond
election shall be posted on the door of each school house in
7.

Ibid .

district. ------ The notice itself is, of course, mandatory."
(8)

Among other irregularities in tbe proceedure for p etitioning
for bond election is tha t of the elap se of time between the posting
of the notice of election a.rxi the election proper.

This period

is definitely mentioned in the statute and most school boards follow
it closely.

However, in some cases of emergencies it has been

found impossible to do so.
the election arises .

Then the question of the legality of

In this particular case, Ru.ral High School

District No. 101 of Jefferson County, ex rel. Bert Metzger, as
Director etc., vs.

w.

E. Davis as State Audi tor, etc., the bonds o-f

the school district were held to be invalid because the notice of
the meeting to authorize them wa s not published for the time required by tbe state statute.

In the original proceedings in

mandamus the trial court denied the wi i t.

It was then appealed to

the supreme court for registration.
The opinion of the court as given by Mason, J. follows:
The proposition to issue the bonds received the ma.jori ty
of votes, but not a majority of all wno were entitled to vote,
although more than sixty percent of the electors had signed
the petition for the election. Therefore, it cannot be said
that the omission to publish tbe notice for the prescribed
time could not possibly have affected the result. Whatever
might be the rule otherwise, in such a situation the defect
has been expresely adjudged to be fatal. The bonds having
been issued without valid authority, the auditor properly
refused to register them. In the brief in behalf of the
district, an argument is made based upon the in~onvenience
and injustice that will result from a decision holding the
11

a. ~ ,

742.

organization to be invalid. The legal existance of the
district, however, is not involved in this proceeding. The
writ asked for is denied. " (9)
It is generally

understood that when bonds a.!'e issued by

school boards, they specify on their face for just what purpose
they a.!'e issued .

In some instances this is not true and no

oo~test has been entered to determine their validity .

In other

cases, particularly when such bonds have been presented to the state
School Fund

for sale, their validity have been contested and such

irregula.!'ity brought before tbe courts .
In the case of the State of Kansas vs. School District No. 3
Chautauqua County, action is brought by tne State School Fund
Commission to collect upon bonds sold by the School District No. 3
of Chautauqua County.

In one of its reason for not peying upon

same, the school district defends that t he bonds did not state upon
their face tbe purpose for which they were issued and from wh ich
particular fund they were to be paid.

Through error £rem the

Chautauqua District Court, the case went to the supreme court f or
trial .

The opinion of the court as g iven by Valentine, J., is that:

"In this case ---- it must be considered that these bonds were
issued in good faith; that the school district received ample
compensation for them; for nothing appears contrary in the
petition, and all the allegations in the petition would tend
to indicate this . We have stated that the bonds do not in
terms specify upon their face the purpose for which they were

9.
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Vol . 98, P• 200.

issued; but we think they do in effect. The bonds specify
upon their face that they were 11 issued in pursuance of an act
of the legislature of the state of Kansas , entitled an Act
to enable School Districts in the State of Kansas to issue
bonds, approved February 26, 1866 and acts aroendatory and
supplementary thereto." Now under that act bonds could be
issued only for one purpose--t hat of providi.og a school house
for the district, eitner by erecting or purchasing the same.
It is true that was not necessary that the bonds snould
recite the act under which they were issued, and it was necessary
that they should recite the purpose for which they were issued;
but as the bonds did recite the act under which they were
issued, and as that act authorizes bonds to be issued only
for one purpose , the bonds do in effect recite the purpose
for which they were issued." (10)
After school bonds have been issued it is the duty of the state
auditor to register them .

Because of the carefulness in which

these bonds are prepared , seldom ever is this registration refused.
However, in some cases the auditor feels unable to register them,
at which time they are contested and brought before the courts,
or action is brought against the auditor co cause an explanation
for his action in same .
Such is the case of J.

c.

Fisher et al., vs.

w.

E. Davis as

State Auditor etc., in which the school district tried to compel
the auditor to register certain rural high school bonds .

The

auditor refused on the grounds that the district had an appeal
from injunction proceedings still pendi.og .
The findings in the case were, that at election the proposition to vote bonds carried, how-ever , the notice of the election
10.

Kansas Reports .

Vol. 34, P• 237 .

proved fatally defective under the statute; that upon the
attention of the board of commissioners being challenged to this
defect, and the pet ition again being pr esented, that board, upon
the same petiti on, ordered another election; tba.t this election
carried.

After the last election, an action was brought in the

District Court of Stafford County against the high school to
enjoin the issuance of the bonds.

The action was tried and judg-

ment rendered in favor of the defendants .

An

appeal was then

filed in the supreme court and was pending at tb.e time this case
was brought

against tne auditor demanding him to register the bonds.

The opinion of the court as deliver ed by Marshall , J. is to
the effeat that:
"When a proper petition is filed under the statute it becomes
the duty of the board of coU.11ty commissioners to call a
special election to vote on establishiug and locating a rural
high school anQ to vote bonds for the construction of a high
school building. That petition is effective until the requirements of the statute· have been complied with . The
requirements of the statute are not complied with until
a valid election is held. In the present case the first
election to vote the bonds was invalid. The petition was
still active. When the attention of the board of the county
commissioners was challenged to the defective election that
board had authority, without a new petition being presented,
to call a special election to vote bonds for the construction
of a high school building. ~or this reason the board of
county commissioners was acting under the law when the second
election was ordered. --- The fact that the appeal is pending
is not sufficient excuse to warrant the auditor in refusing
to register the bonds ." (11)

11 .

Kansas Reports .

Vol . 98 , P• 696 .

In dealing witn bonds, it is to be considered that they are
negotiable instruments, and should come under the control of the
National Negotiable Instrument Law.

The question sometimes arises

as to just how valid these bonds are when placed under the application of this law.

To be valid and negotiable, such instruments

must come under the re quisites of this law.
case of School District

Such is sited in t he

o. 40 of Finney County vs. H.

w.

Cushing

in which Cushing received judgment against the school district for
~505.70, and the defendant appealed the case in error.
The finding s of the court were, that these bonds had been
issued in blank, thus came into being under law as bearer paper;
that Cushing had become a holder in due course and in good faith.
The following opinion of the court as delivered by Milton, J.:
"The statute under which the bonds ~ Jre issued p rovides that
such bonds shall be signed by the director and countersigned
by the clerk and after registration by the county clerk, shall
be negotiable and transferrable by delivery, and may be
disposed of by t he district board at no less than ninety-five
cents on the dollar. Unier this provision such bonds can
certainly be payable to bearer, or to some particular person
or bearer. It is evident that the legisla ture intended to
make bonds of this character negotiable." (12)
In the discussion of bonding and indebtedness, it may be
Froper that we take up at tnis time the question of limitation
of bonded indebtedness .

The statute reads (Ch. 10, Art . 301.

Gen. Statutes of Kansas, 1935), "Except for the refunding of

12 .

Kansas Court of Appeals .

Vol. 8, P • 728.

outstanding debt, including outstanding bonds and matured coupons
thereof, or judgment t hereon, no bonds of any class or description
shall hereafter be issued by~ county, towns hip, city board of
education or sc nool district where the total bonded indeotedness
of such county or towns nip as snown by the last finding and
determination by the proper board of equalization, or where the
total bonaed indebtedness of such city, school d istrict or board
of education would thereby exceed one and one-fi f th percent of
such assessment; but this restriction shall not apply to cities
of the first class."

And, then in Ch. 75, Art. 2316, General

Statutes of' Kansas, 1935, it further states, "That the board of
school fund commissioners of the State of Kansas is hereby
authorized and empowered to make an order aut ilorizing any city
or school district to vote bonds for the purpose of erecting
school buildings to an amount of not more than one hundred p ercent
in excess of, and in addition to, the amount of bonds that may be
voted under laws now in force."
Without question, the makers of our laws have been satisfied
that such limitations on bonded indebtedness were necessary to
meet the necessities of most sc ~ool districts.

However, it has

made it possible tbat by the special arrang;ement before the state
school fund commission, a district mey be allowed to go beyond the
regular limitation.

In some cases, under unusual circumstances,

school boards find that they need to go before the commission

petitioning for the privilege of issuing bonds in excess of the
usual limit .

Such is the experience of School District No. 88 of

Shawnee County as shown in the case of H. B. Cowles vs . School
District 88 of Shawnee County .
This case was an attempt to obtain an order enjoining the
issuance of school district bonds .

The attack on the execution

and the sale of the bonds proposed to be issued. was based on the
claim that the initial steps had not been regularly taken.

This

school district joins the city of Topeka and had a p roperty valuation of f447 , 850 and contained about 213 qualified electors.

A

movement was started to secure a new school house costing about
fl0,000.

Under the bonding limitation law, this could not be

done so it was understood to be necessary to p etition the School
Fund Commission in the matter.

A formal petition was made to the

school board by electors of the district, asking that the board go
before the commission, seeking t ~e p ermission to issue excessive
bonds.

The petition was signed by 119 names, received by t he board

and that board made application according to the p etition.

While

the application was under consideration of the commission, a
number of electors presented a protest and the mentioned suit at
law came from that protest.

The atta ck was made by t ne thought

that tnere were not enough si gners to the petition and tnat a
number of those names upon it were not signatures .

Some si gners

chose to withdraw their names and others of tne district liked to
place their names upon the petition.

The judgment of the court as given by Jonnson,

c.

J. wasa

"The iniatory step was taken by the electors, and their petition
ad.dressed to the school board, and not to the state board .
The action of the state board is invoked by the application
of the school board and a notice of the filing of that
application is required. The state board does not base its
find ings and judgment on the petition to the school d istrict,
but it fixes a day for the hearing and upon the evidence then
offered, under rules which it prescribes, the application
is either granted or denied. The purpose of the petition is
to move t h e school board to make application to the state
board and that purpose has been subserved when the prayer
of the petition was granted and the application mad.e. 0 {13)
Another case closely paralleling this one is cited in which
the general proceedure is not question, but the amount of the issue.
In this case, The Board of Education of School District No. 42 of
Brown Uou.nty, vs.

w.

E. Davis, as State Auditor, registration is

refused on the ground tnat the issue is in excess of the limit
prescribed oy law.

With the permi s sion of the state sc hool f und

commission, the sc hool uistrict had issued bonds and presen ted
tnem to tne state for registration, and had been refused.
The decision of the court as given by Burch , J. is that:
" Vdth the permission of the sc o.ool fund commissioners, the
board of education of a city of the second class may issue
bonds for the purpose of erecting school buildings up to a
maximum limitation of three and three- eights percent. The
bonds presented for registration are well within that limit."

(14)
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The statutes authorize the school

istr1cts to compromise

and refund their bonded indebtedness "upon such terms as can be
agreed upon", the agreement referred to is one between the district
and the owner of the bonds, and the fact that the bonds are held

by the school fund commission, which is an agency of the state
and which acquired them by accepting an offer at par wnich the
statute required to be mad.e, does not authorize a compromise and
refund without its consent
In the case of School District No. 78 of Linn County, vs.
Jess

w.

Miley et al., as tb.e Board of State School .1:i'u.nd Commiss-

ioner&, and E. T. Thompson as State Treasurer, it is shown that
the school district was able to borrow money at a lower rate of
interest than of that which it was paying on its bonds held by
the commission; that the school district de -ia.nded of the commission
that it either accept payment of these bonds which it held or that
it dCCept new bonds bearing a lower rate of interest in exchange.
The commission refueed the demand and the above mentioned case
was brought to bring the liquidation of the ol

bond issue.

The op inion of the court, as delivered by Mas on, J. is that:
"The district is not in a position to pay off the old debt
except by incurring a new one and although the several steps
should be ta.ken at the same time ana the cash for the payment of the present bonds be rod.Cle at once available from the
sale of new ones, the transaction would still be an exchange
of creditors and not a reduction of the principal of the debt.
We hold that the commission is not required either to reduce
the interest contracted for or in effect to sell the bonds to

a purchaser who is willing to do so. This view merely means
that the contract is to be inforced as made. Any app arent
hardship to the district which it involves is a consequence
of the rate of interest having been fixed higher than the
market required or of t he market having been changed." (15)
In the case of the State of Kansas vs. the City of Lawrence,
the attorney-general brought action for the management and investme~t of the school fund.

The complete syllabus of the court is

lengthy and irrevelent in its completeness for the need of discussion
here.

However, t here is one point that need be taken from it for

our d iscussion; that the legisl ature
to ·the

SC

tlOOl

may

compromise the debt owing

fund.

The decision of the court, Smith, Graves, concurring, is:
"The constitution creates a permanent sc hool-fund commission,
consisting of the superintendent of public instruction, the
secretary of state and the attorney ge neral, and declares t hat
the commission shall have the 'managenumt and investment of
the school funds".---- The fund of which it is given the
management and investment is declared to be 'the common
property of the state'. In our opinion it was not intended
in establishing the mission to create an independent
soverignty which should not be amenda ble to the legislature.
The constitution establishes the commission just as it creates
the office of governor. But it reposes the legislative
power in the legislature. And notwithstanding the constltution
gives to the 9ffice of governor the executive power of the
state no one would contend that the legislature is powerless
to enact laws imposing duties on the governor. Can there be
no doubt that the legislature has tbe power to declare the
rate of interest at which the school fund shall be loaned."

(16)
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CONCLUSIONS
The call for an election to be held, after the creation of a
district, to vote on bonds mu.st be made by the district board .
The authority of the board of county commissioners to call an
election to vote bonds for high school is determined by the statute
deali.og with that particular issue .
In cities of the second class, it is the meyors du~y to call
the election, upon proper order from the school b oard.
The rural hi gh school district mey issue bonds for the erection
of a high scnool buildi.og.
Community high schools have no authority to issue bonds as a
school district .
Where~ person's name is signed for him at his direction, and
in his presence, to p etition for bond election, it becomes his own.
The notice of election on bonds is mandatory; and where the
notice of election uid not comply with the statute, such bond
issues were invalid.
Bonds mu.st state upon their face the purpose for which they
were issued; the statutory recitation is sufficient .

The state auditor cannot refuse to register bonds because of
an appeal from injunction proceedings is still pending.
School bonds are valid, although they m~ be made pa,yable
to bank or bearer .
A school district m~ vote bonds in excess of the usual limit
wit h the permission of the state school fund commission .

Also,

a district in second class city may issue bonds for building with
permission of the commission, up to tbree and three-eights percent.
A school district cannot demand a refundiDg of school bonds
held by the state school fund commission without its consent .

OHAFTER VI

OPERATION
The control of the operation of the public schools outside of
ci~ies of the first and second class is by the county superintendent.
Legislative measures have set up an educational organization, running
in it~ s cope from the State Board of Education to the County
Superintendent.
placed upon each.

Certain administrative powers and duties have been
In general, as far as the local condition exists,

the control lies within the power of the

county superintendent.

In the case of M. W. Stewart, as treasurer of Wyandott County,
et al., vs. David J. Adams et al., it is shown that the city of
Argentine, by the proclamation of its meyor bad enlarged its city
limits, thereby gathering into its school district, territory of
another district.

At the same time of the enlargement of the city

it became a city of the second class.

The suit is brought by Mr.

Adams and others againbt the treasurer enjoining the collection of
taxes

for school purposes; Mr. A.dams being a resident of the

newly joined territory contends that it is illegal to collect the
taxes assigned against the annexed property ·f or the operation of the
old school organization.

There are five divisions in the syllabus

of the court, but our interest ~ill be directed upon the one dealing
with the rights of the county superintendent in the matter.

The opinion of the court delivered by Horton,

c.

J. follows:

Wb.en the city of Argentine, became a city of the second
class, it became subject to different laws, both as a municipality and as a school district. The limits of the school
district then became coextensive with the limits of the city,
and territory outside the city limits could be attac hed to
such city for school purposes only in the manner p rescribed
by law---- From and after the date of the organization of
the city of the second class the sc hool board of the annexed
territory could exercise no authority or p erform any act. 11

0

(1)

This discussion and .. the opinion of the judge clearly shows
the authority of the operat ion of the schools to remain in the
office of the county superintendent until it is removed to the
office of the school board of the first or second class city.
The operation of the immediate district is unaer the control
of the board of directors of t hat district.

The major part of t he

discussion of t-his chapter will deal wit h the activities of t h is
group in the operating of t he school.
The state law mentions ad~ f or the annual meeting of the
district, making provisions that special meetings may be called
under certain circumstances.

The interpreta tion of the meaning of

the word "may 11 (it is optional) has caused questions.

In some

inst ances, the court has been called upon for an interpretation.
In such an instance is the case of the State of Kansas, ex rel.
Fred

1.

s.

Jackson, as Attorney-general, vs. School District No. 1

Kansas Reports.

Vol. 50, P• 560.

of Edwards County et al .
In this case the board had, at its regular meeting selected
a site upon which to place a building.

board had the property appraised.

Following th.is action, the

In the meantime some of the

electors found other property which they considered more suitable

and which could be purchased at a lower figure.

These electors

petitioned the board for a special meeting so that they might place
their findings before the electors of the district and ask for a

re-consideration of the action of the p revious annual meeting.
The board refused to call the meeting, on the grounds that
such was

not mandatory,

and that they did not feel obligated

to do so.
The opinion of the court as delivered by Johnston,

c.

J. is:

"Should the school board be compelled by a mandamus to call
a spec-ial meeting of the electors to choose a site for a .
school building when one has already been designated at a
meeting duly called ana where the school board, acting on
that designation, has proceeded to condemn and acquire the
site selecte<i,1 The statute relating to special meetings
provides that - special meetings !Ef&_ be called by the district
board or upon a petit ion signed by ten resident tax:p~ers
of this district. The contention is that the prmvision
that special meetings~ oe called by the district board
-----means that the board not only may, but must,'call
the meeting upon the presentation of the petition . Frimarily and as ordinarily used in the statute the word mey
is permissive rather than premptory." (2)

2.

Kansas Reports.

Vol. 80, P• 667.

Following the previous discussion, that of meetings called
upon petition, it might be well to take u-p the discussion as to
just who is bound to call these meetings.

It is the belief of

t he average elector that this is the dut·y of the director of t he
sc hool board,

but listen to the interpretation of the judge in

t his case of the State of Kansas ex rel., R. D. Armstrong as
County Attorney of Scott County vs.

w.

D. 1uke, as Clerk of School

District No. 2 of Scott County •
.A petition was sig:oed by t he certifi_ed number of electors of

School District No. 2, Scott County, asking the school board to
call a special meeting to vote upon consolidation.

The pe t ition

was delivered to the clerk of the board by the wife of the director
of the board.

The clerk returned the petition to the wife and

refused to post the notice of the called meet i ng.

He decl~red in

his refusal that he was not obligated in posting the notice of the
meeting because the board had no meeting upon t he matter and he
therefore had no authority in doing so.
taken against him to

Mandamus action was

compel him to act in the matter.

The d~

previous to the serving of the writ upon him, he resigned from his
office, and the resignition was accepted
of schools .

by

the county superintendent

The trial court found in favor of the defendant and the

case was presented to

the supreme court for an opinion.

The opinion of the court as delivered by Marshall, J. is t hat:

"The statute does not support the defendant in his contention. The law directs the clerk of the school district to
post t he notices whenever a petition has been signed by
twenty-five percent of the voters in the sc hool district.
The statute does not require action by the sc hool board.
When the petition is presented to the clerk, it is his du.ty
not the duty of the board, to call the election." (3)
The director of the sc hool board is given full control of
lit,i gation, as s hown in the case of School District No. 116 of
Sedgwick County vs . School District No . 141 of Sedgwick County.
The matter for settlement was that of jurisdiction over school
land, which does not enter into our point .

In the trial proceedure

the · director of the plaintiff board moved to d ismiss the case.
The attorney for the board, Mr. J. ¼. Adams, res i sted the move.
This move of the director and the attitude of his attorney is the
part which is of interest in this discussion.

The case was app ealed

to the supreme court in error, and the f ollowing is the decision of
that court given per curiam:
"Upon the showing made, it does not appear that Mr. Adam's
appearance or employment in the case was authorized by t he
school district meeting, or that any provision ha s been made
by a.DY school meeting of the district to prosecute t he action .
It follows, therefore, th~t t he director has full general
authori t y to represent the district and may control the
action as fully as an individual mi ght control his own _
action . He is assigned the duty to appear for and in behalf
of the district in all suits brought by or against the
district, unless other directions shall be given by the voters
of such district at a district meeting." (4)

3.

4.
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AJ;zy

contracts made by a school board , mu.st be made as by

that body .

In other words , one or other of the members~ not

bind the actions of the board by his contracting.

In the case of

Sullivan et al., vs. School District No . 39 of Brown County, et al.,
it is shown that the director of the board ma,.v bind that board with
his signature upon a contract, if at a later time the board or the
district affirms the contract.
In this particular case the director of the board contracted
for the erection of the school building.

Before the building was

completed~ the contractor breached, and left the state .

The

building stood unfinished for some time, then was completed by
other contractors.

Supply houses placed a lien upon the property

because of the material which they had furnish ed the former contractor.

In this case, the parties holding the lien upon the

property seek to collect for the materials put forth .
involved

is that of the unusual

way

~he question

of contracting, and if such a

contract is legal.
The opinion of the court was delivered by Valentine, J.:
"-------Everything seems to have been done, and sufficiently
done that was necessary to entitle the plaintiffs to their
mechanics lien, except that the original contract made by Mr.
Eley, the former contractor, and tne school district was not
made in the manner prescribed by law. It seems to have been
originally made by Eley and only one member of the board ,
but there was evictence introduced tending to show that the
contract was afterward ratified by the other members of the
school board, and also by the entire school district.-----

VI

We think that such a contract might be ratified and made
binding upon the sc hool district."

(5)

The school house and site is considered public property .

The

land is purchased by public money ani the building is erected by
the expenditure of public money.

A.t all times it is placed under

the control of t he board of directors of the school district.

The

use of the building for any private purpo se such as tne holding of
religious meetings, or po~itical meetings, or social gatherings or
the

ike, is not authorized oy law and any t axpey er has the right

to complain although adequate rent is received f or the use of the
builo..ing from such organizations.
In the case of John G. Spencer vs. Joint School District No .
6, etc., Mr. Spencer complains that the joint building of the
district is so being used and that in such use , prop erty belonging
to him, in thew~ of text books, s chool supplies, etc., is destroyed and confiscated, and asks in his petition that the school
district be enjoined from t he letting of the building for such use.
The case was tried in the district court and through error appealed
to the supreme court fot its decision.
The decision of the court follows, as given by Brewer, J.:
"-----It seems to us that upon well-settled principles the
question must be answered in the negative. The public school
house cannot be used for p rivate use, and purposes .
The
5.
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argument is a s r1ort one, taxation is levied to raise funds to
erect the building; but taxation is illegitimate to pr ovi de for
any other purposes. Taxation will not lie to raise funds to
build a place for a religious society, a political society or
a social club. ,hat CallD.Ot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly. As you cannot levy taxes to build a church, no
more mey you levy tax.es to build a school-house and then lease
it for a church.----- The use of a public school house for a
single religious or a political gathering is as uuauthorized
as its constant use thereafter." (6)
Following the decision of the court, offered by Judge Brewer
in the preceding paragrapn , one wonders as t·o the authority of the
district in levying taxes.

This was presented to the court through

the case of The Marion and McPherson Railwey Company vs. T. P .
Alexander, as County l reasurer, etc.
In this case the plaintiff enjoins the collection of taxes
levied for school purposes in District No . 79 of Marion County,
Kansas.

A graded school had been organi zed with identical bound-

aries and electors with sc hool district No . 79 and the t wo were
operating as a union schooi.

The plaintiff contended, that to

operate, the $Chools were not permitted to levy taxes in excess of
two percent .

The school board claimed that it had the right to

levy tax in excess of two percent above that as required to
operate the regular school district.

The supreme court presented

its decision in t he matter through Cunningham, J., as follows :

6.
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"----The authority to levy taxes is an extraordinary one.
It is never left to implication , unless it be a necessary
implication. Its warrant mu.st be clearly found in the act
of the legislature. ,AJ;J.y other rule might lead to great wrong
and oppression , and when there is a reasonable doubt as to
its existance, t he right must be denied . ~herefore, to say
that the right is in doubt, is to deny its existance.-----0ur conclusion is, that the decision of t he district court
must be reversed, with direction to make the injunction
perpetual, restraining all of the defendants from collecting
that part of the school truces in excess of two percent."
( 7)

From this decision of the court, there is no doubt, but that
the right of the school district to levy truces mu.st be clearly
found in the statute.
Statutory provisions are made for the school district to meet
and make the necessary levy for taxes, mald.nij i .t the duty of the
clerk to certify the same to t he board of county commissioners,
upon the receipt __of. which it becomes its duty to make t he levy and
have the county clerk place the same upon the tax roll.

The dates

for the annual meetings are set and according to the difference
in the school organization, at different times, but the periods
for the reports of the school clerks and the commissioners reports
are directory .

The same is the decision of the court in the case

of the Rural High School District No. ~3 in U-efferson County vs.
Kenneth Raub , as County Clerk of Shawnee County .
In this case , the rural high school district was formed so
late in the year (August 15) that when the new school board through
7.
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its clerk certified the same to the county commissioners, and that
body made the levy for taxation and asked the county clerk to
spread the same upon the tax rolls, he refused to do so, placing
as his reason, tbat the same should have been done on or before
the first Monday in August

and

that it was now too late .

The

school board brought action against the clerk of the county to
force him to write the levy upon the tax roll of the district .
Porter, J . reports the opinion of the court as:
"We think, however, that in view of the general princi2les
upon which the reason for the rule of interpretation referred
to rests, and the interests of tbe public in a case like the
present, we are warranted in holding that the provisions in
respect of time in which the officers shall act are directory
and not manditory . The statute authorizes the organization
of a rural high school district by an election, which is the
duty of the commissioners to call whenever the proper petition
is presented asking for such an election , and this without
regard to the time of the year at which the petition is
presented. - -- - Manifestly , the purpose of fixing the time
in which the various officers shall perform their duties was
simply to insure an orderly and prompt conduct of official
business . --- --· We hold therefore, t hat the provision must
be regarded as directory only, and not mand itory." (8)
Whenever the tax for sc~ool purposes is voted, the same
reported to the board of county commissioners,

and

the clerk

of the county has spread the same upon the tax rolls of that district,
there is a valid levy .
A rather unusual case of this kind is recorded in that of
School District No . 127 of Reno County vs . School District No . 45

a.

Kansas Reports .

Vol . 103 , P• 757 .

of Reno County .

The county superintendent , by regular proceedings

attached a strip of land to school district No . 45 which had previously been a pa.rt of school district No . 127 .

t the annual school

meeting , the school district No . 45, with knowledge of the annexation
voted a tax of twenty-five mills and the school district No. 127 ,
with like knowledge of the loss of the land, voted a tax of thirteen
mills .

Both tax records were in due course, certified to the county

boa.rd of commissioners, which in turn, asked the clerk of the county
to spread the same upon the rolls for taxation against the two
districts.

Tb.e clerk of the county, by mistake, overlooked the

previous change of bourrla.ries, and entered upon the tax rolls,
thirteen mills voted by scnool district No. 127, upon the pro_perty
in the

trip of land which belonged to school district No . 45, and

which should have carried twenty-five mill s .

Furthermore, in the

apportionment of the school funds, the school district No. 127
drew the thirteen mills taxation from this strip which amounted to
~21 . 13.

In the case,

school district No . 45 ~ried to collect

this amount from the school district No . 127.
The opinion of the supreme court as given by Smith, J. is to
t i s effect a
"-----It cannot be ea.id that the county clerk extended on the
rolls a levy by school district No. 127 against the property
in the strip of land attached to school district No. 45, as

·,~

there waa no such levy extended . The coU1J.ty clerk, whatever
was in his mind, simply extended upon the rolls, against the
property in the strip , a levy less in amount than had been
legally made by t he school aistrict No . 45 . Neither by his
action in tnis respect nor the fact that a higher rate s hould
have been extended and collected can Qeprive the scnool district
No . 45 of the money which was lawfully collected for it . The
mistake of the county clerk, and that of the treasurer, in
peying the money , wnich belonged to school uistrict No . 45 ,
to school district No . 127 , gave no right to the latter to
retain the same or to r efuse the demand of school district
No . 45 therefor . 11 (9 )
There is an occassion whereby the county superinteMent ma,y make
the high school l evy when the commissioners fail to do or refuse
to do so .

The county commissioners place the levy for the county

high school, and in

case they do not, the coU1J.ty superintendent

of public instruction may do so, which levy cannot

be

in excess

of the product of ~1 , 200 times the number of teachers of the high
scnool .
This is shown in the case of The Board of Education of the
City of Pr att vs . Thomas E. Eubank, as County Superintendent, of
Schools , as an original proceeding for declaratory judgment.
The county commissioners made a levy of 1 . 148 mills, and the
county superint endent made a levy of 1.168 mills .

Later on

reconsideration , the county superintendent made and certified a
second levy of 1 . 35 mills , the legal limit .

The first levy of the

county superintendent was placed on the tax rolls, but the second

9.
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levy

did not reacb. the clerk ill time to be placed upon the rolls .

The result of which was a shortage in the school funds for the year.
Burch, J. reports the interpretation of the court in the
following:
"-----The amount to be raised is the product of $1200
multiplied by the number of teachers. It is the duty
of the county cornmis bioners to make a levy sufficient to
produce that sum. If the county conmissioners fail to make
a levy sufficient to produce that sum, the county superintendent shall make a suitable levy, that is, a levy to produce
that sum. The legislature has determined the needs of the
schools, the statute is mandatory tbmoughout, and neither
the county board nor the COUllty superintendent has any
discretion in the matter·" ( 10)
In first and second class cities, the statutes axrange for
a different method of certifying taxes for the sc hools.

The

sc hool board prepares the budget and before it may become effective
it must have the

approval of the city council.

But the auestion

has arisen in some instances as to the meaning of the clause,
"approval of the qi ty council".
otherwise?

Is t his approval mandatory or

In the case of the State of Kansas ex rel., vs.

William addis , Mayor , et al., this question is settled and the
relationship between the city council anu the city school board
established .
In this particular case, the board of education of the city
of F.nporia prepared the budget calling for a fifteen mills levy
ror the year to expend in the operation of the schools, and pre10.
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sented the same to the city council of Emporia.

In a meeting of the

council, it was decided not to approve the levy of fifteen mills,
and offered to approve tne budget at thirteen mills.

Upon this

decision of tne city council, the school board drew a writ of
mand.amu.s against the city boaru and meyor, trying to enforce the
acceptance of the budget as requested at fifteen mills.

The writ

was denied by the trial court and appealed to the supreme court
for its decision.

.l!'ollowing is the opinion of the court as given

by Johnston, J-:

n----We think the terms employed when given their natural

and ordinary signification involve an exercise of judgment
and discretion, and that the approval referred to implies the
official assent and sanction of the city council. Nothing
in the consequences of the act or in the difficulties attending its operation warrant s the court in eliminating one of
the checks plainly placed by the legislature upon the p ower
of imposing a tax..---- It might have lodged the power of
determining this levy i n ei the:r of the ~A ·bodies, as well as
in both of the~, and might have required that there be a
joint concurrence.---- The writ will be denied." (11)
It is within the power of the rural high-school to levy for

school _purpose at its annual meeting.

This is unusual, in its

aFplication, in that t his power is not granted the ordinary school
district board.

This is the opinion of the court in the case of

Otis Laswell et al., vs. G. M. Seaton et al., as the School Board
of High School District No. 3 of Pottawatomie County.

This case is

of an injUllction served against the board to keep it from building,

11.
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when it was thought not to have money enough on hands from the
sale of bonds .

Th e school board h~d figured that with the present

money on hands, it would be able to start the operation and meet
the ba lance needed by taxation.

Further details of the case are

not needed in the discussion; t he statement of the judge concerning
t l.1 e taxing powers of the board is to our interest.
The opinion of the court as g iven by Porter, J. carries t~
f ollowing statement:
In the same section (Section 4 of Chapter 284 of the Laws
of 1917) it is provided that the annual meeting of the high
school ooard shall be held on the f ollowing Mon.day , at which
time t he board is required to make the necessary levy for
taxes , not to exceed four ·mills on the dollar on the valuation
of all property in the high school district, to pa,y teachers,
to $~eate a fund to retire any indebtedness and interest on
the same , to purchase a site, to _b uild, hire or pur chase a
school house a.n11 to pc33 incidental exg enses of the high
school . It is at the annual meeting of Ghe high school board
that it determines how the school shall be conducted and
makes the tax levy . " (1 2)
11

The school district is bound ·by the contract of i t s board
members for r epairs .

It is the duty of the board and a part of its

obligat i ons t o its district to see that t he building is k ept in
constant repair .

It is granted that because of the different

element s , the building is bound to decay and be in
of repair .

constant need

I t is within the vo i ce of the electors that certain

specific r epair s be done , and that the budget be enlarged to meet

12.
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the expenditures necessary for the same.

But even

at that with

sucb. a budget depleted , the board finds itself obligated to do
other needed repairs.
Such is shown in the case of
No. 37 , etc.

c.

F, Conklin vs, School District

Mr , Conklin with help , placed a glass in the school

hou~e door and did some painting of the walls of tbe building,
after which, he billed the school board for ~5 . uO .

The ooard

refused top~ the bill stating that tne budget for repairs, as
arranged by the electors at the annual meeting was completely
depleted ,
court.

The case was app ealed, through error to the supreme

The decision of that court, as given by Brewer , J. is:

•tThe district board shall have the care and keeping of t he
school house and other property belonging to the district,
which authorizes and requires that the board preserve and
care for the school house." (13)
It sometimes happens tbat because of necessity and convenience, one or the other members of the school board will sign an
order for the purchase of school supplies, without the knowledge and
sanction of the other members of the boara.

Taen the question will

arise as to the legality of such an action, and by what , if acy ,
authority such action was executed.

Sometirres school boards have

acti.og committies , with authority ~elegated to them to act if it
is within their judgment to

13 ,
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In the case of the Union School ~urniture Compaey vs . School
District No . 60 of Elk County , it is shown that a member of the
school board signed a.n order for f'urni ture and some other school
supplies, without the sanction of the complete board, and that,
because he had in his possession signed warrants, filled one out
for the purchases invoice and delivered tt to the agent.

The

merchandise, being delivered, was immediately put into service.
The furniture c ompa.Dy presented the warrant for acceptance and
payment , but was unable to get the school board to make payment
upon it.

The contract ran along for a peri od of five years and the

furniture company placed the contract within the hands of the court
for collection.

The defendant board was able to defeat the case in

t he trial court, so the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court,
in error, for satisfaction within its contrnct.
The opinion of the court as delivered by Allen, J. follows:
- - ---It is found oy the court, and all evidence in the case
shows, that t he defendant school district received the school
fu.rni ture----and has held and used t be same----over a period
of nearly five and one-half years . we are utterly at a loss
to understand how tile defendant, having kept and used tbe
furnitur e during all this time can claim to be excused from
making any _payment therefor . It uay be conceded that both
the written instruments were void, and that no action could
be maintained on either or botn of them; yet the defendant
district , having rece i ved and retained the property-----is bound in common honesty to p ay for it." (14)

11
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Ordinarily, when a school board assumes its duties, that
body is considered as a board of directors of the school district .
Those duties are numerable and variable .

The state statute tries

to enumerate those duties, but even then we find them questioned .
Occassions arise whereby the board is left in a quandry as to its
scope of authority .

Into just which particular division of the

budget may this contract be placed , and if placed there, has the
board the authority to make such a contract?
In the case of N. J . swayze vs. school District No . 17,
Chase county, the question arose as to the authority of t he school
board in purchasing a mathematical chart as necessary appendages
or apparatus .
The syllabus of the court shows that the school board contracted
for the chart and issued a warrant for the purchase price.

The

warrant, being negotiable, was delivered to ..r. N. J . swayze,
who presented it and demanded payment .

Upon the refusal of the

treasurer to honor the warrant, M.X' . swayze placed the same with
the court, asking for satisfaction .

The decision of the trial

court was in his favor , because of which, the school board appealed.
The opinion of the court as delivered by valentine , J . is:
"-----Now it is certain that all kinds of school apparatus
are not included among the artic l es prop erly denominated
11 appendages 11 ;
but we think it is equally certain that some
kinds of school apparatus may be denoted "appendages''";
for instance, we would think that blackboards, outline maps

and mathematical chart s , hung upon walls of the school house and
to remain there p ermanently f or t he purpose of illustrating
such l essons in science, history or geography as might be
taught in the schools, might properly be denominated both
"school apparatus and ' app endages"' . A mathematical chart
might be hung upon the wal 1 s _o f a school house and become
an appendage; and it might al s o be used for the pur pose of
illus trating the science of mathematics and thereby become
a part of t he apparatus used by the school.-----The evidence
in controversy , outside of the order itself , tends to
show t hat t he apparatus for which it was given was a
. mathematical chart. It is possible, and even probable , that
this chart was in fact wort hless; but as there was no evidence
that it was worthl ess, it must be p resumed that it had value ,
and that it was worth the amount wb.ic the sc hoo l board
agreed to pay for it.-----We cannot say t hat aey material
error was committed by the court below, and therefore , its
judgment must be affirmed." (15)
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CONCLUSION
The operation of school district s , outsi de of cit i e s of the
first and second clas s is controlled by t he coUll.ty super intendent
of pu blic instruction.
The provision for sch ool d istrict meetings called up on
peti ti on of resident tax payers is held to be pe rmissive rather
ttian mandatory .
Whenever a sc hool board is petitioned to meet, i t is the duty
of t he clerk of the board to post notices calling t b.e meeting.
Because of tb.e corporate powers g iven t b.e school di stric t ,
it becomes the duty of tb.e d irector of t he bo ar d to a ssume contro l
of litigation.
contract being made by one member of the school board
is void.

However, it m~ become valid when,

and

i f , rati f ied by

t he whole board.
If a.DY tax: payer has a legal rig ht of dissension, t h e school
building cannot be used for social g atherings, political gat herings
or private use although adequate rent is paid.
The right of the district to levy taxes must be clearly
found in the statutes.

tSJ.

The statute concerning the levy of taxes by the school board
is directory; the county commissioners having the right to adjust,
and a taxpayer having the right to contest the same.
'Where the tax voted at a regular schooa meeting becomes
certified by the county clerk, there is a valid tax.
It is the duty of tbe county superintendent of publ ic
instruction to make a gigh school levy when the commissioners of
the county fail or refuse to do so.
The school board tax levy in cities of the second class must
have the intelligent approval of tbe city council.
The rural high school board has the power to levy tax.es for
school purposes at the annual meeting.
The school board is bound by its contract for repairs.
The retention and use of school furniture bought without
authority rati fies the contract of purchase.
The school board has the authority to purchase a mathematical
chart as necessary appendages or apparatus.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court, as chief interpreter of the laws of tb.e State ,
in relation to the schools, holds closely to tb.e constitution, and
to state rights.

Also, that scb.ools mu.st be pv.rely democratic .

This generalization is clearly shown in the decision of the court
in the case of the City of Pratt vs. Thomas E. Eu.bank , as County
Superintendent , (p. 73), and in the case of Olin G. Cline et al.,
vs.

w.

G. Wettst ein et al., (p. 17-18).

In the case of the City of Pratt vs. Thomas E. Eubank as
County Superintendent, cited in the previou R paragraph, it may
further be observed that provision for free schools is mandatory,
a.nd the obligation for this provision, is a responsibility of
the citizen, as taxpayer, and an elector of the state.
In the interpretation of a specific law, the Sup reme Court
tends to seek the will of the people of a district, rather than
to follow strictly the reading of the law .

This is clear in the

case of Rural High School District No. 101 of Jefferson County,
ex rel., Bert Metzger, as Director, etc., vs.
State Auditor, etc., (p. 49).

w.

E. Davis , as

Ou

The court , rather closely holus, that school organizations
are quasi-corporat ions acting as agencies for the State.

In

this

way it is able to clearly distinguish between quasi-corporations
and paying corporations.
the thesis,

Citation is made to a number of cases in

(5, 6, 7, 22).

The.Supreme Court looks upon commercial contracts of a school
board in the same li ght as any contract drawn in commercial activities; frequently presenting e~oss-citations of decisions made ,
regarding contracts of regular commercial enterprises, to explain
its decision in a particular case.
H.

c.

Hensley and

o. c.

This is shown in the case of

Brosus as Partners etc., vs. School

District No. 87 of Anderson County, etc. , (p.36- 37), the case of

u.

F. Conklin vs . School District No. 37, etc . , (p. 76), and the

case of N. J . Swayze vs . School District No . 17 of Chase County,
{p. 78- 79) .
In the interpretation of the court, regarding laws affecting
the organizing of schools, one finds a rather liberal attitude.
It all ows for continued economic and social growt~ , realizing that
our society is dynamic and. that the organization of schools and
the interpretation of the sc hool laws rrru.st necessarily be made to
fit such a society .

These facts may easily be seen in its attitude

concerning the consolidation of school districts, the re-organizing
of school districts and attaching parts of a district to first and
second class city districts , and in its review of the "Cash Basis Law".

Never once, in the practices of the court has it refused to
listen to a damaged taxpayer of a school district.

In the case

of John G. Spencer vs. the Joint District No . 6, etc ., Mr.
Spencer became damaged by the activities permitted within the
building.

It

seemed that the activities were sanctioned by the

majority of the electors of the district, and that possibly Mr.
Spencer was alone in the case , (p. 67- 68).
However, the court has reprimanded the scnool board or a
single member of the board for not having faithfully met the
trust placed upon him by the electors of the school district , as
s~own in the case of R. D• .Armstrong as County Attorney of Scott
County vs. W. D. Luke , as ~lerk of School District No . 2 of
Scott County, (p. 64-65).
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